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Abstract:	 Empirical studies of so called ‘unconventional’ monetary policy –
‘Quantitative Easing’ or ‘Large Scale Asset Purchases’ - since the North Atlantic Financial
Crisis of 2007-2009 in the United Kingdom and elsewhere have mainly focussed on the
effect of policy on intermediate variables rather than the stated ultimate goal of such
policies, boosting nominal demand and GDP growth. Secondly and relatedly they tend to
focus on the crisis and post-crisis period, a time of extraordinary economic and financial
dislocation, which creates counterfactual and attribution problems and fails to capture
typical macroeconomic lag dynamics. Adopting the approach of Voutsinas and Werner
(2010), and building on Lyonnet and Werner’s (2012) study of UK QE, this paper
addresses these weaknesses by 1) examining the impact of various different monetary
policy instruments (including Quantitative Easing) directly on UK nominal GDP growth;
and 2) using a quarterly time series beginning in the first quarter of 1990 and up to the last
quarter of 2012 (92 observations in total). We use the Hendry ‘general-to-specific’
econometric methodology to estimate a parsimonious model. The results show that
disaggregated bank credit to the real economy (households and firms) has the most
significant impact on nominal GDP growth. Changes to the central bank’s interest rate,
central bank reserves, and total central bank asset ratios drop out of the model as
insignificant. The policy implication it that, as private banks continue to shrink their
balance sheets in the UK and Europe following the North Atlantic Crisis of 2008, central
banks might wish to consider ‘unconventional’ monetary policies that more directly boost
credit to the real economy and thus nominal GDP growth. 
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Abstract. Empirical studies of so called ‘unconventional’ monetary policy – ‘Quantitative Easing’ or ‘Large 
Scale Asset Purchases’ - since the North Atlantic Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere have mainly focussed on the effect of policy on intermediate variables rather than the stated ultimate 
goal of such policies, boosting nominal demand and GDP growth. Secondly and relatedly they tend to focus on 
the crisis and post-crisis period, a time of extraordinary economic and financial dislocation, which creates 
counterfactual and attribution problems and fails to capture typical macroeconomic lag dynamics. Adopting the 
approach of Voutsinas and Werner (2010), and building on Lyonnet and Werner’s (2012) study of UK QE, this 
paper addresses these weaknesses by 1) examining the impact of various different monetary policy instruments 
(including Quantitative Easing) directly on UK nominal GDP growth; and 2) using a quarterly time series 
beginning in the first quarter of 1990 and up to the last quarter of 2012 (92 observations in total). We use the 
Hendry ‘general-to-specific’ econometric methodology to estimate a parsimonious model. The results show that 
disaggregated bank credit to the real economy (households and firms) has the most significant impact on 
nominal GDP growth. Changes to the central bank’s interest rate, central bank reserves, and total central bank 
asset ratios drop out of the model as insignificant. The policy implication it that, as private banks continue to 
shrink their balance sheets in the UK and Europe following the North Atlantic Crisis of 2008, central banks 
might wish to consider ‘unconventional’ monetary policies that more directly boost credit to the real economy 
and thus nominal GDP growth. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The turmoil in global financial assets markets following the announcements by Ben Bernanke 
that the Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing (or Large Scale Asset Purchase) Program may 
be slowed
4  has raised further questions about the effectiveness of such so called 
‘unconventional’ monetary policies pursued by central banks to deal with the North Atlantic 
Financial Crisis of 2007-09 and resulting global downturn. One implication of this market 
volatility is that Q.E. may artificially inflate financial asset prices, with resulting temporary 
confidence effects, but make little difference to macroeconomic fundamentals.   
 
Unfortunately, much of the existing literature on QE does not specifically examine the impact 
of QE on key broader macroeconomic variables, such as nominal demand, GDP growth and 
inflation. This is despite the fact that some central banks, including the Bank of England, 
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made it clear that these were the ultimate goals of the policy.
 5 Empirical studies of QE type 
policies have been criticised for instead focusing on the effect of policy on intermediate 
variables – typically financial asset prices or yields, medium and long-term interest rates or 
changes in broad money (Lyonnet and Werner 2012; Martin and Milas 2012). The effects of 
such changes on nominal GDP are sometimes hypothesised – using concepts such as 
‘portfolio rebalancing’ (section 2) – rather than empirically tested. Another problem with 
existing studies is the time period over which analysis is conducted. Many studies, in 
particular event studies and VAR models, focus on the crisis and post-crisis period, a time of 
extraordinary economic and financial dislocation, which creates counterfactual and 
attribution problems and fails to capture typical macroeconomic lag dynamics.  
 
In this paper we address these two issues. To address the first problem, and following 
Voutsinas and Werner’s methodological approach (2010) and Lyonnet and Werner’s study of 
UK QE (2012), we examine the impact of various different monetary policy instruments 
(including so called ‘unconventional’ instruments such as Quantitative Easing) directly on 
nominal GDP growth, with this latter as the dependent variable. Secondly, we use a quarterly 
time series from the first quarter of 1990 and up to the last quarter of 2012 (92 observations 
in total) in order to better capture time dynamics and the effects of shocks (Lyonnet and 
Werner’s study ran from 1995-2010).   
 
We employ the Hendry ‘general-to-specific’ econometric methodology (following Hendry 
and Mizon, 1978) to develop a reduced form parsimonious model based on actual historical 
relationships between variables. The results show that disaggregated bank credit to the real 
economy (households and firms) has the most significant impact on nominal GDP growth, 
confirming Lyonnet and Werner’s (2012) findings, Werner’s Quantity Theory of Credit 
(1992, 1997; 2005) and the ‘credit theory of money’ approach (Mitchell-Innes 1914; Wray 
1994; Werner, 2005; Ryan-Collins et al 2012). 
 
The paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 reviews existing studies of QE and equivalent 
unconventional monetary policy interventions since the 2007-2009 crisis. Section 3 describes 
our empirical methodology. Section 4 describes our data and Section 5 our results. Diagnostic 
tests of the results are laid out in Section 6. Section 7 interprets our results and Section 8 
concludes with implications for monetary policy and suggestions for further research. 
 
 
 
2. The QE transmission mechanism and review of existing studies 
 
Hypthesised impact of QE 
Quantitative Easing involves central banks engaging in large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) 
in order to provide greater liquidity to markets and/or to push down medium and long term 
interest rates once the short-term central bank rate has reached the so called ‘zero lower 
bound’.
6 The literature on QE has identified four main channels, or ‘transmission 
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mechanisms’, through which QE is thought to impact on the economy; the ‘signalling 
channel’, the portfolio rebalancing effect’ the ‘bank lending’ or ‘liquidity’ channel and the 
‘wealth effect’ (Bowdler and Radia 2012: 608).  
 
i) Signaling channel 
 
Since QE as practiced is mainly focused on changing behavior in highly liquid financial 
markets, expectations play a strong role. Announcements by central bankers, even if quite 
vague, can have strong impacts on markets by revealing information about the likely future 
path of monetary policy, as has been quite evident in the recent announcements of Ben 
Bernanke. 
  
ii) The portfolio rebalancing channel 
 
The Bank of England has placed the most emphasis on the impact of QE on changes in 
investors’ portfolios.
7 The purchase of gilts from financial investors by the APF creates new 
deposits for those investors. The increase in central bank reserves (narrow money) has led to 
an equal increase in bank deposits (broad money). The important question for assessing the 
macroeconomic impact is what they will do with these deposits. The theory is that this 
‘shock’ to their portfolio will lead to investors rebalancing their holdings by seeking out 
similar kinds of financial assets. They may want to do this for a number of reasons. First, 
government bonds, particularly longer dated gilts (e.g. 10 or 25 years) will have a higher rate 
of return than deposits. Secondly, certain kinds of investors, in particular pension funds, will 
want to hold assets of longer maturity than deposits as they have correspondingly long-dated 
liabilities.     
 
The hope is that investors will switch instead to corporate assets – bonds or equities (shares) 
– that will in turn support businesses operating in the real economy. However, investors have 
other options. They may choose to switch into foreign government bonds instead. They may 
simply buy existing corporate securities from other investors rather than newly issued 
securities from companies. Only in the latter case, known as the primary market, will 
companies receive more funds and this is only a fraction of the overall turnover of capital 
markets. They may choose to invest in derivatives based on commodities such as oil or food, 
which will have the effect of inflating the prices of these assets. Or they may in the end 
choose to simply hold the deposits, in which case QE will have made no contribution to 
nominal GDP at all. 
 
If investors choose to purchase newly issued corporate assets, this will bring down the cost of 
issuing new equity or bonds for firms and mean it is likely they will be able to access more 
finance. However, it is then up to the firms to decide what to spend this new money on. It 
will only contribute to GDP transactions and growth if it is invested in new production. In the 
current environment in the UK, it appears larger firms may prefer to hold on to the deposits. 
The Office of National Statistics recently estimated that the UK companies were sitting on 
£750 billion in cash, 50 per cent of GDP (Guardian 2013). Or companies might use the funds 
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Central Banks.  For international reviews see Joyce et al (2012) and Fawley and Neely (2013).  
7 Note that this is not the same as the theoretical ‘money multiplier’ effect which assumes, wrongly, that banks 
will increase lending by a multiple of the increase in reserves.  The theory behind portfolio rebalancing was first 
developed by the economist James Tobin writing in the 1960s (Tobin 1961, 1969). 	 5
to pay down existing bank loans. This will have the paradoxical effect of reducing the money 
supply. 
 
iii) The wealth effect 
 
An additional potential consequence of portfolio rebalancing is known as the ‘wealth effect’. 
As investors buy more equities this should push up their price, meaning holders of these 
assets will feel wealthier. They may choose to invest this additional wealth in consumption 
which would contribute to GDP growth (although it may not help the trade deficit if it 
involves buying goods that are imported).  However, again it is not clear that asset holders 
will do this.  They might just buy other kinds of existing assets or save the money. 
Furthermore the impact on consumption for any consumer will depend on whether they feel it 
is a long-term or merely a short-term improvement in their economic position, and how the 
current increase in wealth affects their confidence about their future financial prospects (the 
problem of ‘Ricardian equivalence’). It is also possible that banks, which also hold assets, 
will also feel a ‘wealth effect’ because the value of their capital will rise. They may then pass 
on this effect via charging lower rates of interest. As with the liquidity effect mentioned 
earlier, however, the Bank of England has downplayed such an impact, arguing that the 
banking sector has been too severely damaged by the crisis for this to make a significant 
difference.  
 
iv) The bank lending channel 
 
As commercial banks hold significantly higher levels of central bank reserves as a result of 
QE, it is possible that additional liquidity and reduced cost of funding will encourage banks 
to increase their lending to the real economy, creating credit for new GDP transactions. 
However, as Werner (2005) argued concerning Japan, banks’ credit extension was not limited 
by liquidity or reserve constraint – hence it is not obvious that increased liquidity or reserves 
will have a visible impact. 
 
The first phase of QE in 2009, when £200 billion was injected in the space of just six months, 
may have supported bank lending, or at least prevented a further fall in credit creation, 
although the Bank of England has played down this effect in its analysis. A number of other 
schemes aimed more directly at improving banks’ balance sheets were also underway at the 
time, including the Government guaranteeing bonds issued by the banks (the credit guarantee 
scheme ), the SLS, and the partial nationalisations of RBS and Lloyds via massive tax-payer-
funded re-capitalisations. These interventions would appear to support the banking system 
more directly and hence prevent further contractions in lending.   
 
Either way, the impact of expansion of central bank reserves on credit creation is indirect and 
dependent entirely on banks’ confidence. Their overall effect is likely to be limited, simply 
because banks were already holding excess reserves before the policy was adopted. It is not 
obvious that a significant increase in the amount of excess reserves will have any impact on 
banks’ lending decisions. This is especially true since central bank reserves cannot in total be 
reduced by banks ‘lending the money’ – banks create new credit when they lend, for which 
they do not need reserves, and the reserves at the central bank cannot in aggregate be reduced 
by banks via any action of their own (Ryan-Collins et al. 2012). Thus, in aggregate, banks 
must hold these large reserve balances, and they currently receive 0.5 per cent interest on 
them.   
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Actual impact of QE 
There are both attribution and counterfactual issues when empirically examining the impact 
of QE. Attribution issues arise when it is not possible to isolate the impact of one among 
many different causal factors. A number of other interventions occurred at the same time as 
QE: a historically unparalleled drop in interest rates, a massive increase in government 
spending and reduction in taxation as automatic stabilizers commenced and huge injections 
of government money to support the liquidity and capital requirements of UK banks. In 
addition, other countries – the USA, Japan, and the Eurozone in particular – were also 
undertaking QE-type policies meaning there were likely to be spill-over effects, especially 
given the internationalised nature of the UK economy.   
 
The counterfactual problem is that we can never know what would have happened if we had 
not carried out QE, so we can never truly know its impact (Werner, 2005, cites fiscal policy 
and interest rate policy supporters who use this argument to explain that their policy 
suggestions did work, although the economy failed to recover). We can only observe how the 
economy has changed. QE was initiated during extraordinary economic times – with output 
and bank lending and confidence in stock-markets collapsing in a fashion not seen since the 
Great Depression. Finally, whilst analysis of changes in financial markets (asset prices, risk 
spreads) is fairly amenable to direct observation, this is less true for the broader 
macroeconomic impact where significant time lags may be present (Martin and Milas, 2012).    
 
It may be for the latter reason that the vast majority of empirical studies of QE, both in the 
UK and internationally, have concentrated on the impact of QE on changes in financial 
markets. Such studies have been criticised for missing the point; since the ultimate objective 
of QE was to boost nominal GDP and inflation, measuring such intermediate variables 
appears not very useful (Lyonnet and Werner 2012; Goodhart and Ashworth 2012).  
Nevertheless, a huge number of such studies have been conducted, mainly by central banks 
themselves. ‘Meta-reviews’ of these studies point towards two main conclusions: 1) that the 
earlier QE interventions (in 2008-09) prevented a more dramatic fall in output and deflation 
and had a significant impact in pushing down medium and long term interest rates
8 and 2) the 
policy runs in to diminishing returns, a dynamic that may be explained by the fact that market 
anticipation of central bank actions weakens their impact (or makes their impact more 
difficult to detect empirically) (Bowdler and Radia 2012; Martin and Milas 2012; Joyce et al 
2012; Goodhart and Ashworth 2012).  
3. Methodological approach 
Our empirical quantitative research attempts to overcome the attribution and counterfactual 
problems described above in two ways. First, following Lyonnet and Werner (2012), we 
examine a wide range of different central bank tools and instruments, including QE-related 
variables such as the total assets of the central bank and the ratio of long term central bank 
assets to total assets, directly on nominal GDP growth, a widely accepted final target variable 
for monetary policy.
9 These are laid out in Table 1, along with their hypothesised effects, 
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peak and boosted annual inflation by around 1.25 per cent. See Joyce et al (2012).  
9 The literature on central bank performance identifies a range of goals related to macroeconomic stability, 
including price- and exchange rate-stability and maximizing output (Hasan and Master 2008: 6 in Lyonnet and 
Werner 2012: 99).  The remit of the Bank of England is as follows: In relation to monetary policy, the objectives 
of the Bank of England shall be—(a) to maintain price stability, and (b) subject to that, to support the economic 
policy of Her Majesty's Government.   This latter has been most recently defined as: “to achieve strong, 
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which relate to the channels described in section 2 above. Secondly, we use a longer quarterly 
time series, from the first quarter of 1990 and up to the last quarter of 2012, a total of 92 
observations. This compares with Lyonnet and Werner’s (2012) smaller sample, from Q2, 
1995 to Q4, 2010 (63 observations). We regressed four ‘lags’ of each variable and also 
included lags of the dependent variable (nominal GDP growth) to take in to account typical 
macroeconomic dynamics. This provides us with a total of 34 different independent 
variables. We include two dummy variables: the first in 2000, quarter 2, to capture a 
structural break (see Appendix for explanation) and the second to adjust for the effect of the 
financial crisis, which runs from 2008 quarter 2 to 2009, quarter 2. 
 
The general-to-specific methodology (also known as the Hendry, LSE or gets methodology) 
involves estimating a broad model with as many variables and lags as possible in order to 
ensure no important variables are excluded and that the resulting regression residuals are pure 
white noise. It is useful in a context where there remains considerable uncertainty about the 
transmission mechanism of QE to nominal GDP since it allows various different monetary 
policy tools, intermediary instruments and versions of ‘quantitative easing’ (as shown in table 
1) to be equally represented in the first general model (Lyonnet and Werner 2012: 99; 
Campos, Ericsson and Hendry 2005). An example would be the equation below in which the 
dependent variable has an autoregressive component (       and it is a function of two 
independent variables:  
 
        β  Y   
   
 ,   
  γ  X     
   
 ,   
 δ  Z   
   
 ,   
     
 
Our ‘general-to-specific’ methodology involves sequentially reducing the least significant of 
the independent variables in the general model down until we are left with a parsimonious 
specific model.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Central Bank monetary policy instruments used to estimate general model 
 
Variable Variable  name 
(Quarterly Year-
on-Year change 
except for Bank 
rate and 
QualEasing) 
Hypothesised effect 
Bank Rate (the bank of 
England interest rate 
charged to banks for 
holding reserves) 
Bankrate  Standard monetary policy impact 
– reduce interest rate leads to 
increased growth 
																																																																																																																																																																												
from the Chancellor to the Governor laying out the Monetary Policy Remit, 20 March 2013, p. 4. Retrieved 
from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/monetary-policy-remit-2013  [accessed 20 May 2013].  
Nominal GDP growth can be seen to combine price stability and output. 
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Quantity of reserves in the 
banking system 
Reserves  More reserves in the banking 
system reduces liquidity and 
funding costs and  leads to more 
bank lending and increased growth 
Bank of England total 
assets 
BoETA ‘Portfolio  rebalancing effect’ – as 
the bank takes more safe assets on 
to its balance sheet and pushes up 
prices, it should stimulate 
investors to switch to corporate 
assets (bonds or equities), leading 
to increased business investment 
Qualitative easing – the 
ratio of long-term assets 
(government bonds) to 
Total Assets held on the 
Bank of England’s 
balance sheet 
QualEasing ‘Portfolio  re-balancing effect’ – by 
pushing down medium and long 
term interest rates on government 
bonds, investors should again be 
incentivized to buy corporate 
assets. 
Broad money -  the 
broadest deposit aggregate  
M4  Increase in broad money will have 
portfolio re-balancing effects as 
investors switch out of deposits 
and in to higher yielding corporate 
assets.  
Bank credit to the real 
economy (excluding the 
effects of securitization), 
following Werner (1992, 
1997, 2005) and Lyonnet 
and Werner (2012) 
M4LREx  Credit creation by banks for GDP 
transactions should directly create 
growth 
 
4. Data description 
We used Bank of England (BoE) data to construct our time series with the exception of 
nominal GDP which was sourced from the Office of National Statistics (ONS).
10 Codes are 
shown in the table below. All data is quarterly since this is the most frequent period available 
for the dependent variable, nominal GDP. Where data were only available in weekly or 
monthly form, we used the value at the end of every quarter. All data is non-seasonally-
adjusted. A dummy to adjust for the financial crisis was employed from 2008, Quarter 2 to 
2009, Quarter 2. 
 
For nominal GDP, Bank of England reserves, total assets, money and credit aggregates (M4 
and M4 lending to the real economy) and ‘Qualitative Easing’ we had to construct new time 
series.  Calculations are shown in the table below.  In order to de-trend the data and to adjust 
for seasonality, we use quarterly year-on-year growth rates for all data except interest rates 
obtain by using the following equation
11: 
 
																																																								
10 All data can be downloaded from the Bank of England Interactive Database: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/newintermed.asp  
11 YoY means year-on-year growth rate and x is a generic variable. 	 9
      
           
    
 
Figure 2: Data sources 
 
Variable Variable 
name 
(Quarterly 
Year-on-
Year growth 
rate) 
Series name  
(Bank of England unless specified) 
Code  
(Bank of 
England 
interactive 
database code 
unless stated) 
Nominal GDP 
 
 
YoYGDP  Office of National Statistics (ONS): 
Total gross final expenditure (aligned 
- P.3+P.5+P.6 : CP NSA) – (minus) 
Statistical Discrepancy Gross 
Domestic Product : CP NSA 
ONS codes:  
ABMD 
RVFD 
 
 
Bank rate (the bank of 
England interest rate 
charged to banks for 
holding reserves) 
Bankrate  Quarterly average of official Bank 
Rate 
IUQABEDR 
 
Quantity of reserves in 
the banking system 
Reserves  Prior to May 2006: Monthly average 
amount outstanding of total sterling 
M0 total (in sterling millions) not 
seasonally adjusted (discontinued 
April 2006) – (minus) Monthly 
average amount outstanding of total 
sterling notes and coin in circulation, 
excluding backing assets for 
commercial banknote issue in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland total 
(in sterling millions) 
May 2006 onwards: 
Weekly amounts outstanding of BoE 
Banking department sterling reserve 
balance liabilities)   
LPMAVAD  
LPMAVAA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RPWBL38 
Bank of England Total 
assets 
BoETA  Prior to March 2006: (Banking 
department) securities issued by 
central government + sterling and 
foreign currency securities + 
premises equipment and other + notes 
and coins holdings + (Issue 
department) securities issued by 
central government + other securities; 
Post March 2006: Total assets of 
issuing department + total assets of 
banking department  
RPQAEFJ, 
RPQAEFK, 
RPQAEFLRPQ
AEFM, 
RPQAEFC, 
RPQAEFD 
 
 
 
 
RPWBL37, 
RPWBL56 
Qualitative easing – the 
ratio of long-term assets 
(government bonds) to 
Total Assets held on the 
Bank of England’s 
balance sheet 
QualEasing  Prior to March 2006:  
Banking dept securities issued by 
Central govt + Issue dept 
securities issued by central 
govt)/(divided by) BoE Total 
Assets;  
Post March 2006: (Bonds and other 
securities acquired via market 
transactions (in sterling millions) + 
bonds acquired via OMOs + 
assets in the APF + Corporate 
bonds/ (divided by) BoE Total 
RPQAEFJ, 
RPQAEFC 
 
 
 
 
RPWBL53 
RPWBL35 
YWWB9T9 
YWWB8X9 
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Aassets 
 
Broad money   M4  Quarterly amounts outstanding of 
monetary financial institutions' 
sterling M4 liabilities to: other 
financial corporations + private non-
financial corporations + household 
sector (in sterling millions)  
LPQVVHX, 
LPQVVID, 
LPQVVIJ 
 
Bank credit to the real 
economy (excluding the 
effects of securitization) 
M4LREx  As above, removing ‘other financial 
corporations’ 
LPQB9Y2, 
LPQB8DF, 
LPQB8DG 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
We describe here our final and preferred estimation (model C). To trace our analysis, further 
estimations (models A and B) are provided in the Appendix. 
 
The general model, including the 2000 structural break dummy (‘dummy’) and the Crisis 
dummy (Crisis_D), is shown below in Figure 1. The basis for including the structural break 
dummy is included in model B in the Appendix. The Durbin-Watson test shows there is no 
autocorrelation and the errors are normally distributed.   
 
Figure 3: General Model C - OLS, using observations 1990:1-2012:4 (T = 92) 
Dependent variable: YoYGDP 
 
   Coefficient  Std. Error  t-ratio  p-value   
const 0.0249344  0.00908891  2.7434  0.00819  ***
YoYRES -7.61975e-05 3.02671e-05 -2.5175  0.01476  ** 
YoYRES_1 -6.62188e-05 2.93291e-05 -2.2578  0.02795  ** 
YoYRES_2 9.19783e-06 2.93496e-05 0.3134  0.75517   
YoYRES_3 -4.21146e-06 3.02712e-05 -0.1391  0.88986   
YoYRES_4 3.76472e-05 3.0299e-05  1.2425  0.21932   
YoYBoETA -0.00105094 0.00431688  -0.2434  0.80856   
YoYBoETA_1 -0.00926949 0.00520039  -1.7825  0.08019  * 
YoYBoETA_2 0.0141851  0.00553259  2.5639  0.01311  ** 
YoYBoETA_3 -0.00646392 0.00556768  -1.1610  0.25067   
YoYBoETA_4 -0.003486  0.00492422  -0.7079  0.48198   
YoYNEFQE -0.00103618 0.00136695  -0.7580  0.45167   
YoYNEFQE_1 -0.000896671 0.00136307  -0.6578  0.51339   
YoYNEFQE_2 0.00331343  0.0013231  2.5043  0.01526  ** 
YoYNEFQE_3 -0.00110933 0.00124534  -0.8908  0.37693   
YoYNEFQE_4 0.000422252 0.00107365  0.3933  0.69563   
YoYM4 0.102053  0.0795711  1.2825  0.20503   
YoYM4_1 -0.0313196  0.111396  -0.2812  0.77965   
YoYM4 _2  -0.0304176  0.109518  -0.2777  0.78225   
YoYM4_ 3  0.0596739  0.111845  0.5335  0.59581   
YoYM4_ 4  0.0299127  0.0719486  0.4158  0.67921   
YoYM4LRE 0.00402401  0.120824  0.0333  0.97355   
YoYM4LREx_1 0.124451  0.1678  0.7417  0.46145   
YoYM4LREx_2 0.103917  0.15824  0.6567  0.51411   	 11
YoYM4LREx_3 -0.0496884  0.159658  -0.3112  0.75681   
YoYM4LREx _4  -0.0811745  0.121528  -0.6679  0.50696   
Crisis_D -0.0420206  0.00659758  -6.3691  <0.00001  ***
dummy -0.0110376  0.00491631  -2.2451  0.02880  ** 
Bankrate 0.00330934  0.00281588  1.1752  0.24496   
Bankrate_1 -0.00754664 0.00445187  -1.6952  0.09570  * 
Bankrate_2 0.00228548  0.00469228  0.4871  0.62814   
Bankrate_3 -0.00335639 0.00472247  -0.7107  0.48026   
Bankrate_4 0.00395858  0.0028291  1.3992  0.16736   
YoYGDP_1 0.288447  0.098532  2.9274  0.00496  ***
YoYGDP_2 0.265904  0.114733  2.3176  0.02422  ** 
YoYGDP_3 0.232589  0.122017  1.9062  0.06186  * 
YoYGDP_4 -0.30932  0.11198  -2.7623  0.00779  ***
 
Mean dependent var   0.047987   S.D. dependent var   0.023799
Sum squared resid   0.003656   S.E. of regression   0.008154
R-squared   0.929060   Adjusted R-squared   0.882626
F(36, 55)   20.00828   P-value(F)   6.56e-21
Log-likelihood   335.5782   Akaike criterion  -597.1563
Schwarz criterion  -503.8501   Hannan-Quinn  -559.4971
rho -0.025489   Durbin's  h  -0.712306
 
 
To identify the specific, or restricted, model, the regression is then progressively simplified 
by removing the least significant explanatory variables based on information from t-statistics 
(‘t-ratio’) and p-values. We used the Gretl software package to conduct this ‘sequential 
elimination’ – see below. For each sequential elimination, the validity of the result is checked 
by using F-tests and linear restriction tests. As a cut-off for the validity of the reduction 
progress, the 1% level was chosen.. 
 
   
 Sequential elimination using two-sided alpha = 0.01 
 
 Dropping YoYM4LREx_LPQB   (p-value 0.974) 
 Dropping YoYRES_3         (p-value 0.885) 
 Dropping YoYBoETA         (p-value 0.803) 
 Dropping YoYM4_LPQVV_1    (p-value 0.796) 
 Dropping YoYRES_2         (p-value 0.753) 
 Dropping YoYM4LREx_LPQB_3 (p-value 0.705) 
 Dropping YoYM4_LPQVV_4    (p-value 0.672) 
 Dropping YoYNEFQE_4       (p-value 0.692) 
 Dropping Bankrate_2       (p-value 0.545) 
 Dropping YoYM4LREx_LPQB_2 (p-value 0.515) 
 Dropping Bankrate_3       (p-value 0.533) 
 Dropping YoYNEFQE_1       (p-value 0.396) 
 Dropping YoYBoETA_4       (p-value 0.402) 
 Dropping YoYM4LREx_LPQB_4 (p-value 0.339) 
 Dropping YoYNEFQE_3       (p-value 0.266) 
 Dropping Bankrate         (p-value 0.146) 	 12
 Dropping YoYNEFQE         (p-value 0.158) 
 Dropping YoYRES_4         (p-value 0.061) 
 Dropping Bankrate_4       (p-value 0.057) 
 Dropping YoYM4_LPQVV      (p-value 0.095) 
 Dropping YoYM4_LPQVV_2    (p-value 0.205) 
 Dropping YoYBoETA_3       (p-value 0.079) 
 Dropping YoYBoETA_2       (p-value 0.093) 
 Dropping YoYBoETA_1       (p-value 0.246) 
 Dropping YoYM4_LPQVV_3    (p-value 0.069) 
 Dropping YoYRES_1         (p-value 0.076) 
 Dropping YoYRES           (p-value 0.036) 
 Dropping Bankrate_1       (p-value 0.020) 
 Dropping YoYNEFQE_2       (p-value 0.024) 
 Dropping YoYGDP_3         (p-value 0.083) 
 
Test on Model 1: 
 
  Null hypothesis: the regression parameters are zero for the variables: 
 
YoYRES, YoYRES_1, YoYRES_2, YoYRES_3, YoYRES_4, YoYBoETA, YoYBoETA_1, 
YoYBoETA_2, YoYBoETA_3, YoYBoETA_4, Bankrate, Bankrate_1, Bankrate_2, 
Bankrate_3, Bankrate_4, YoYNEFQE, YoYNEFQE_1, YoYNEFQE_2, YoYNEFQE_3,  
YoYNEFQE_4, YoYM4_LPQVV, YoYM4_LPQVV_1, YoYM4_LPQVV_2, 
YoYM4_LPQVV_3, YoYM4_LPQVV_4, YoYM4LREx_LPQB, YoYM4LREx_LPQB_2, 
YoYM4LREx_LPQB_3, YoYM4LREx_LPQB_4, YoYGDP_3 
 
  Test statistic: F(30, 55) = 1.84726, p-value 0.0240913 
  Omitting variables improved 2 of 3 model selection statistics. 
 
This leaves us with parsimonious model C below. 
 
Figure 4 - Parsimonious model C - OLS, using observations 1990:1-2012:4 (T = 92) 
Dependent variable: YoYGDP 
 
   Coefficient  Std. Error  t-ratio  p-value   
const 0.0291163  0.00363823  8.0029  <0.00001  ***
Crisis_D_short -0.0337562  0.00514234  -6.5644 <0.00001  ***
YoYM4LREx_1 0.122704  0.0256994 4.7746  <0.00001  ***
dummy -0.00848437 0.00233445  -3.6344  0.00048  ***
YoYGDP_1 0.41572  0.0840194  4.9479  <0.00001  ***
YoYGDP_2 0.328568  0.088118  3.7287  0.00035  ***
YoYGDP_4 -0.379147  0.0685698  -5.5294  <0.00001  ***
 
Mean dependent var   0.047987   S.D. dependent var   0.023799
Sum squared resid   0.007341   S.E. of regression   0.009293
R-squared   0.857580   Adjusted R-squared   0.847527
F(6, 85)   85.30455   P-value(F)   7.63e-34
Log-likelihood   303.5190   Akaike criterion  -593.0380
Schwarz criterion  -575.3855   Hannan-Quinn  -585.9133	 13
rho -0.053420   Durbin's  h  -0.852154
 
 
 
6. Test diagnostics on Model C 
 
In order to evaluate our model and ensure Gauss-Markov conditions are satisfied we carried 
out various diagnostic tests, listed below: 
 
i) Heteroskedasticity 
 
 
 
 
a) Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
Test statistic: LM = 2.465131 
with p-value = P(Chi-square(6) > 2.465131) = 0.872350 
 
b) White's test for heteroskedasticity 
Test statistic: TR^2 = 8.078438, 
with p-value = P(Chi-square(10) > 8.078438) = 0.621175 
c) Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
Dependent variable: scaled uhat^2 (Koenker robust variant) 
Test statistic: LM = 3.457228, 
with p-value = P(Chi-square(6) > 3.457228) = 0.749651 
 
d) Test for ARCH of order 4 
  Null hypothesis: no ARCH effect is present 
  Test statistic: LM = 2.13602 
  with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 2.13602) = 0.710758 
 
ii) Normality 
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a) Normality test 
Frequency distribution for uhat22, obs 61-152 
number of bins = 9, mean = -8.73961e-018, sd = 0.00929304 
 
       interval          midpt   frequency    rel.     cum. 
 
            < -0.017436  -0.020033       2      2.17%    2.17%  
  -0.017436 - -0.012241  -0.014839       7      7.61%    9.78% ** 
  -0.012241 - -0.0070472 -0.0096443     11     11.96%   21.74% **** 
 -0.0070472 - -0.0018529 -0.0044500     16     17.39%   39.13% ****** 
 -0.0018529 -  0.0033414  0.00074427    22     23.91%   63.04% ******** 
  0.0033414 -  0.0085357  0.0059386     17     18.48%   81.52% ****** 
  0.0085357 -  0.013730   0.011133      13     14.13%   95.65% ***** 
   0.013730 -  0.018924   0.016327       3      3.26%   98.91% * 
           >=  0.018924   0.021521       1      1.09%  100.00%  
 
Test for null hypothesis of normal distribution: 
Chi-square(2) = 1.949 with p-value 0.37734 
 
 
3) Autocorrelation 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation up to order 4 
OLS, using observations 1990:1-2012:4 (T = 92) 
Dependent variable: uhat 	 15
 
Unadjusted R-squared = 0.098926 
 
Test statistic: LMF = 2.223176, 
with p-value = P(F(4,81) > 2.22318) = 0.0737 
 
Alternative statistic: TR^2 = 9.101171, 
with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 9.10117) = 0.0586 
 
Ljung-Box Q' = 5.3421, 
with p-value = P(Chi-square(4) > 5.3421) = 0.254 
 
 
4) Collinearity, specification and stability 
 
a) Collinearity 
Variance Inflation Factors 
 
Minimum possible value = 1.0 
Values > 10.0 may indicate a collinearity problem 
 
Crisis_D_short    1.448 
YoYM4LREx_LPQB_1    2.094 
dummy    1.43 
YoYGDP_1    4.333 
YoYGDP_2    4.911 
YoYGDP_4    3.129 
 
b) Specification 
 
RESET test for specification (squares and cubes) 
Test statistic: F = 0.633564, 
with p-value = P(F(2,83) > 0.633564) = 0.533 
 
RESET test for specification (squares only) 
Test statistic: F = 0.551409, 
with p-value = P(F(1,84) > 0.551409) = 0.46 
 
RESET test for specification (cubes only) 
Test statistic: F = 0.058659, 
with p-value = P(F(1,84) > 0.0586586) = 0.809 
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d) Chow test for structural break 
Augmented regression for Chow test 
OLS, using observations 1990:1-2012:4 (T = 92) 
Dependent variable: YoYGDP 
 
                      coefficient  std. error  t-ratio  p-value  
  -------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const                0.0282363   0.00839201   3.365   0.0012   *** 
  Crisis_D_short      -0.0345067   0.00543551  -6.348   1.18e-08 *** 
  YoYM4LREx_LPQB_1     0.136386    0.0730834    1.866   0.0656   * 
  dummy               -0.00702060  0.00890893  -0.7880  0.4330   
  YoYGDP_1             0.523891    0.174284     3.006   0.0035   *** 
  YoYGDP_2             0.209974    0.190875     1.100   0.2746   
  YoYGDP_4            -0.368863    0.151761    -2.431   0.0173   ** 
  sd_YoYM4LREx_L~_1   -0.0150839   0.0784252   -0.1923  0.8480   
  sd_YoYGDP_1         -0.146788    0.200357    -0.7326  0.4659   
  sd_YoYGDP_2          0.156933    0.217052     0.7230  0.4718   
  sd_YoYGDP_4         -0.0204926   0.171391    -0.1196  0.9051   
 
Mean dependent var   0.047987   S.D. dependent var   0.023799 
Sum squared resid    0.007273   S.E. of regression   0.009476 
R-squared            0.858895   Adjusted R-squared   0.841474 
F(10, 81)            49.30401   P-value(F)           2.83e-30 
Log-likelihood       303.9456   Akaike criterion    -585.8912 
Schwarz criterion   -558.1515   Hannan-Quinn        -574.6952 
rho                 -0.066985   Durbin-Watson        2.130624 
 
Chow test for structural break at observation 2000:2 
F(4, 81) = 0.188664 with p-value 0.943 
 
 
 
7. Interpretation of results  
 
Our results suggest changes in bank credit creation to the real economy (with a one-year time 
lag – M4LREx_1) are the most important predictor of GDP growth, taking into account the 
relative changes in all the other variables discussed. Changes in interest rates and increases to 
‘broad money’ (increased deposits in the hands of investors and banks) do not appear to have 
had any significant effect on nominal GDP growth even in non-recessionary periods (e.g. 
1993 to 2008) – both variables drop out of the specific model.  Likewise the proposed 
‘portfolio re-balancing’ instruments, ‘QualitativeEasing’ and changes to total Bank of 
England assets. The lags of GDP (e.g. YoYGDP_2) remain in the parsimonious model, but 
this is quite a standard result for quarterly time series data.   
 
As shown in Figure 16, the results support the Quantity Theory of Credit (Werner 1992, 
1997, 2005) which postulates that nominal GDP growth is a function of credit creation for 
GDP transactions. It is found that the relationship between credit creation for the real 
economy and nominal GDP is close for the whole 12-year period under analysis, with the 
exception of the crisis period itself where credit creation appears to lag GDP growth. We 
believe this may be due to various systemic distortions, as well as the impact of automatic 	 18
stabilisers
12 coming into effect as the recession emerged and also the international effects 
described earlier, in particular the action of the Federal Reserve. The UK banking system, 
meanwhile, took much longer to recover for reasons already described in detail.  
 
 
Figure 6. Bank lending to the real economy versus growth rate of nominal GDP. 
1990, Q1 to 2012, Q1  
 
 
 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
 
Our results support earlier studies by Voutsinas and Werner (2010) and Lyonnet and Werner 
(2012) that disaggregated bank credit creation for the real economy is the most important 
predictor of nominal GDP growth when taking in to account a wide-range of alternative 
monetary policy instruments and variables. Since QE as practised in the UK effectively 
bypasses the banking system, relying instead on capital markets to buy corporate assets, this 
may be one explanation for why QE has not enabled a more rapid recovery from the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008.  
 
Perhaps in recognition that QE was too indirect a policy, the Bank of England introduced the 
Funding for Lending (FLS) scheme in 2012 in the hope of more directly influencing bank 
credit creation towards the real economy. FLS subsidizes the funding cost for banks which 
create loans for households and small businesses and appears to have adopted the definition 
of ‘credit for the real economy’ proposed in Lyonnet and Werner (2012), which was 
																																																								
12 Automatic stabilisers describe changes in taxation and government spending (fiscal policy) that occur to 
smooth out the effects of fluctuations in GDP growth.  Because many taxes, such as income tax, corporate tax 
and VAT are based upon output and/or are progressive, a recession has the effect of proportionately reducing 
the proportion of such taxes taken out of the economy.  In addition, government spending automatically 
increases during a recession due to increased welfare and unemployment benefits, creating economic multiplier 
effects.  The combined effect is an increase the government deficit to counter falls in private output. The 
opposite process applies during booms.  See Sullivan and Sheffrin (2003). 	 19
originally presented to the Bank of England in 2011. Initial results show the scheme would 
appear to have stimulated more credit creation for the real economy but the majority of this 
has gone to households for mortgages rather than to SMEs. Mortgage lending may just 
increase house prices.  If this happens, it is possible that there may be some wealth effect in 
the short term, encouraging more consumption, but in the long-term the higher monthly 
mortgage repayments suffered by new entrants to the housing market paying inflated house 
prices might reduce consumer demand.   
 
Only lending to businesses can be more reliably viewed as resulting in an increase in GDP 
transactions, without the negative effects of asset inflation or consumer price inflation.  It is 
for this reason perhaps that the Bank of England chose in March 2013 to alter the terms of 
FLS to more specifically incentivize lending to SMEs over mortgage financing.
13   
 
An interesting further research topic would be to be to attempt to model the proportion of 
mortgage lending that flows through to the real economy in contrast to simply inflating asset 
prices. It would also be interesting to see if the results in this paper could be replicated in 
other countries which have undertaken simply large scale asset purchase programs. 
 
 
																																																								
13News Release - Bank of England and HM Treasury announce extension to the Funding for Lending Scheme. 
Retrieved from  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/061.aspx  	 20
Technical Appendix 
 
Model A: Observations from 1980:1-2012 
 
The sample that we take into account for this regression is from 1990 to 2012 but we initially  
collected data from 1980. Despite the fact that the coefficients are similar to the previous one 
(Figure A.1), we restricted the sample because the Gauss-Markov condition are violated. In 
particular the errors are not normally distributed and there is evidence of heteroskedasticity. 
There were a number of structural breaks in the 1980s in Britain due to unusually high 
inflation and for this reason we restricted the sample.   
Figure A1: Parsimonious model of Ordinary Least Squared general-to-specific model of QE variables regressed on to 
Quarterly Year-on-Year GDP growth, 1980 Q1: 2012:Q4 (132 observations) 
 
   Coefficient  Std. Error  t-ratio  p-value   
Const 0.00953472  0.00261078  3.6521  0.00038  ***
YoYBoETA_2 0.0107738  0.00385805  2.7926 0.00607  ***
YoYBoETA_4 -0.0115364  0.00400406  -2.8812 0.00468  ***
YoYNEFQE_2 0.00304718  0.000795065 3.8326  0.00020  ***
YoYM4LREex_1 0.103171 0.0205367  5.0237  <0.00001  ***
dummy -0.0369636  0.00611303  -6.0467  <0.00001  ***
YoYGDP_1 0.463211  0.0754441  6.1398  <0.00001  ***
YoYGDP_2 0.438207  0.0803962  5.4506  <0.00001  ***
YoYGDP_4 -0.218422  0.0545321  -4.0054  0.00011  ***
 
Mean dependent var   0.064641  S.D. dependent var   0.036686 
Sum squared resid   0.017523  S.E. of regression   0.011936 
R-squared   0.900611  Adjusted R-squared   0.894147 
F(8, 123)   139.3204  P-value(F)   6.80e-58 
Log-likelihood   401.8835  Akaike criterion  -785.7670 
Schwarz criterion  -759.8218  Hannan-Quinn  -775.2241 
Rho -0.020196  Durbin's  h  -0.458314 
 
 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
OLS, using observations 1980:1-2012:4 (T = 132) 
Dependent variable: scaled uhat^2 
 
                     coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value 
  ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const               -0.0793279    0.429728    -0.1846    0.8538  
  YoYBoETA_2           0.301090     0.635025     0.4741    0.6362  
  YoYBoETA_4          -0.414958     0.659060    -0.6296    0.5301  
  YoYNEFQE_2          -0.0680486    0.130866    -0.5200    0.6040  
  YoYM4LREx_LPQB_1    -0.166313     3.38030     -0.04920   0.9608  
  Crisis_D_short       1.60560      1.00619      1.596     0.1131  
  YoYGDP_1            27.6400      12.4179       2.226     0.0278  ** 
  YoYGDP_2            11.3055      13.2330       0.8543    0.3946  
  YoYGDP_4           -21.9379       8.97585     -2.444     0.0159  ** 
 	 21
  Explained sum of squares = 101.04 
 
Test statistic: LM = 50.520245, 
with p-value = P(Chi-square(8) > 50.520245) = 0.000000 
 
 
 
 
 
Model B: Observations from 1990:1-2012:4 without structural break 
 
So we then tested the model from 1990:1-2012:4 and found that this avoided the normality 
and heteroskedacity problems identified in Model A above.  The General and Specific 
Models are presented below. 
 
General model B: 1990:1-2012:4 without 2000 structural break 
 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-ratio  p-value   
const 0.00974754  0.00628568  1.5508  0.12659   
YoYRES -8.5881e-05 3.10202e-05 -2.7686  0.00762  ***
YoYRES_1 -7.09675e-05 3.02897e-05 -2.3430  0.02271  ** 
YoYRES_2 1.05363e-05 3.03837e-05 0.3468  0.73006   
YoYRES_3 -4.6415e-06 3.13436e-05 -0.1481  0.88281   
YoYRES_4 3.8788e-05  3.13686e-05 1.2365  0.22143   
YoYBoETA -0.000510247 0.00446294  -0.1143  0.90939   
YoYBoETA_1 -0.00646442 0.00522702  -1.2367  0.22135   
YoYBoETA_2 0.0160313  0.00566507  2.8299 0.00645  ***
YoYBoETA_3 -0.00759924 0.00574121  -1.3236  0.19100   
YoYBoETA_4 -0.00718111 0.00480553  -1.4943  0.14070   
YoYNEFQE -0.000603262 0.00140125  -0.4305  0.66847   
YoYNEFQE_1 -0.000529566 0.00140119 -0.3779  0.70690   
YoYNEFQE_2 0.003633  0.00136205  2.6673 0.00998  ***
YoYNEFQE_3 -0.00122851 0.00128832  -0.9536  0.34440   
YoYNEFQE_4 -9.40695e-06 0.00109374 -0.0086  0.99317   	 22
YoYM4 0.148073  0.079611  1.8600  0.06815  * 
YoYM4_1 -0.0307791  0.115345  -0.2668  0.79057   
YoYM4_2 -0.0365762  0.113364  -0.3226  0.74817   
YoYM4_3 0.0806316  0.115405  0.6987  0.48764   
YoYM4_4 -0.0134738  0.0717615  -0.1878  0.85174   
YoYM4LREex 0.0137589  0.125027 0.1100  0.91277   
YoYM4LREex_1 0.100307  0.17339  0.5785  0.56524   
YoYM4LREex_2 0.0687403  0.163044  0.4216  0.67493  
YoYM4LREex_3 -0.0274242  0.164999  -0.1662  0.86859  
YoYM4LREex_4  -0.154702  0.12118 -1.2766 0.20700   
Bankrate 0.00479425  0.00283413  1.6916  0.09628  * 
Bankrate_1 -0.00841568 0.00459223  -1.8326  0.07218  * 
Bankrate_2 0.00280826  0.00485262  0.5787  0.56511   
Bankrate_3 -0.00312503 0.00488871  -0.6392  0.52528   
Bankrate_4 0.00459671  0.00291456  1.5772  0.12039   
dummy -0.0431866  0.00681025  -6.3414  <0.00001  ***
YoYGDP_1 0.321651  0.100869  3.1888  0.00234  ***
YoYGDP_2 0.316585  0.116478  2.7180  0.00873  ***
YoYGDP_3 0.251664  0.126036  1.9968  0.05072  * 
YoYGDP_4 -0.332525  0.115455  -2.8801  0.00562  ***
 
Mean dependent var   0.047987   S.D. dependent var   0.023799
Sum squared resid   0.003992   S.E. of regression   0.008443
R-squared   0.922558   Adjusted R-squared   0.874157
F(35, 56)   19.06067   P-value(F)   1.47e-20
Log-likelihood   331.5446   Akaike criterion  -591.0892
Schwarz criterion  -500.3048   Hannan-Quinn  -554.4478
rho -0.054700   Durbin's  h  -1.916675
 
 
Parsimonious model B 
 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-ratio  p-value   
const 0.0200038  0.00281726  7.1004  <0.00001  ***
YoYM4LREex_1 0.0918259  0.025919  3.5428  0.00064 ***
dummy -0.0363168  0.00544343  -6.6717  <0.00001  ***
YoYGDP_1 0.453059  0.0891117  5.0842  <0.00001  ***
YoYGDP_2 0.335024  0.0941462  3.5585  0.00061  ***
YoYGDP_4 -0.291836  0.0686314  -4.2522  0.00005  ***
 
Mean dependent var   0.047987   S.D. dependent var   0.023799
Sum squared resid   0.008481   S.E. of regression   0.009931
R-squared   0.835448   Adjusted R-squared   0.825881
F(5, 86)   87.32633   P-value(F)   3.40e-32
Log-likelihood   296.8744   Akaike criterion  -581.7489
Schwarz criterion  -566.6182   Hannan-Quinn  -575.6420
rho -0.003576   Durbin's  h  -0.064769
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We conducted diagnostic tests on this model.  The Cusum Q test shows that potentially there 
is an additional structural break in 2000 (as well as the crisis in 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 In order to check this possibility we did a Quandt likelihood ratio test and a Chow test. Both 
tests confirm that there is a structural break. 
 
 
 
 
 
Augmented regression for Chow test 
 
OLS, using observations 1990:1-2012:4 (T = 92) 
Dependent variable: YoYGDP 
Omitted due to exact collinearity: sd_Crisis_D_short 
 
                            coefficient    std. error  t-ratio  p-value  
  -------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const                    0.0282363     0.00839201   3.365   0.0012   *** 	 24
  YoYM4LREx_LPQB_1       0.136386      0.0730834    1.866   0.0656   * 
  Crisis_D_short          -0.0345067     0.00543551  -6.348   1.18e-08 *** 
  YoYGDP_1                 0.523891      0.174284     3.006   0.0035   *** 
  YoYGDP_2                0.209974      0.190875     1.100   0.2746   
  YoYGDP_4                -0.368863      0.151761    -2.431   0.0173   ** 
  splitdum                -0.00702060    0.00890893  -0.7880  0.4330   
  sd_YoYM4LREx_L~_1     -0.0150839     0.0784252   -0.1923  0.8480   
  sd_YoYGDP_1           -0.146788      0.200357    -0.7326  0.4659   
  sd_YoYGDP_2            0.156933      0.217052     0.7230  0.4718   
  sd_YoYGDP_4           -0.0204926     0.171391    -0.1196  0.9051   
 
Mean dependent var   0.047987   S.D. dependent var   0.023799 
Sum squared resid    0.007273   S.E. of regression   0.009476 
R-squared            0.858895   Adjusted R-squared   0.841474 
F(10, 81)            49.30401   P-value(F)           2.83e-30 
Log-likelihood       303.9456   Akaike criterion    -585.8912 
Schwarz criterion   -558.1515   Hannan-Quinn        -574.6952 
rho                 -0.066985   Durbin-Watson        2.130624 
 
Chow test for structural break at observation 2000:2 
  F(5, 81) = 2.69187 with p-value 0.0266 
 
Given the existence of the structural break in 2000, we thus introduced the dummy for 2000 
described in section 5. 
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